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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
emphasized by Pothier 41 and has been consolidated in France,
Quebec and Louisiana. For some reason, the fifth category-
obligations which arise from the operation of law-is being over-
looked in Louisiana and should be more clearly recognized. On
the issue of the appropriate period for liberative prescription,
it does make a difference.
State Lumber & Supply Co. v. Gill 42 involved a claim against
the owner for supplies furnished on a construction project where
the supplier had not fulfilled all the statutory requirements for
the preservation of his lien against the property. The statute
provides a special one-year prescription for the personal cause
of action against the owner but adds that "this shall not inter-
fere with the personal liability of the owner for material sold
to or services or labor performed for him or his authorized
agent. '48 Thus the court succinctly stated the question on which
depended the classification of the cause of action as "whether
this was a contract job or whether Rousset was hired as an
employee or agent by defendant Gill."' 44 On the evidence, the
court found that Rousset was employed by Gill and therefore
the statutory prescription of one year did not apply. Conse-
quently, the supplier's cause of action was classified as one on
open account subject to the three-year prescription of Civil Code
article 3538.
MINERAL RIGHTS
George W. Hardy, III*
MINERAL LEASES
Implied Obligations
The appellate opinion in Baker v. Chevron Oil Co.1 was dis-
cussed in last year's Symposium.2 In that discussion it was noted
that the case suggests the possibility that a lessee might be im-
pliedly obligated to a lessor who has granted a lease on a min-
41. POTHIER, OBLIGATIONs no. 2: "The sources of obligations are contracts,
quasi-contracts, offenses, quasi-offenses; sometimes the law or equity alone."
42. 259 So.2d 639 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1972).
43. LA. R.S. 9:4812 (1950).
.44. 259 So.2d 639, 641 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1972).
* Professor of Mineral Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 245 So.2d 457 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1971).
2. Symposium, 32 LA. L. REv. 254, 261 (1972).
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eral servitude to exercise due diligence to secure unitization if
formation of the unit would result in an interruption (or suspen-
sion) of prescription and thus preservation of the servitude. The
Louisiana supreme court has now considered the case on writs
and affirmed the judgment of the court of appeal.8 The plaintiffs'
claim for damages because of alleged lack of diligence in secur-
ing the unitization was denied in both instances. In the supreme
court, however, the basis upon which the claim for damages was
denied was changed. The court noted that defendant Chevron
Oil Co. was not the plaintiffs' lessee and therefore could not be
found to be under any obligation to the plaintiffs. The fact that
Chevron was not plaintiffs' lessee is not readily discernible from
the appellate opinion. However, the supreme court's finding in
this regard certainly is more than adequate as a basis for its
decision. The court, in disposing of the claim for damages con-
ceded the existence of a duty to secure the unitization with all
due diligence only for the purpose of discussion. Thus, the ques-
tion of whether such a duty might be found to exist as a part of
the lessee's obligation to act as a good administrator under article
2710 of the Civil Code or on any other basis remains unanswered.
It is certainly an interesting idea.
Drilling Clauses
Plaintiff, in Allen v. Continental Oil Co.,4 claimed that defen-
dant's lease had expired by the running of the primary term. The
lease in question provided that it would not expire at the end
of the primary term if lessee was "then engaged in drilling or
reworking operations." By the date marking the end of the pri-
mary term, the lessee had constructed and gravelled an access
road, dug slush pits, laid gas and water lines, moved on a spudder
rig which had drilled thirty-five feet of hole and set conductor
pipe, and attempted to move the drilling rig onto the site, which
it had been prevented from doing by virtue of heavy rains which
had washed out a portion of the access road. The operations were
subsequently prosecuted to a successful conclusion. Citing sev-
eral prior decisions, the court applied what it viewed as the
general rule in interpreting the phrase "drilling operations" and
decided that actual drilling was not necessary under a wording
3. Baker v. Chevron Oil Co., 260 La. 1143, 258 So2d 531 (1972).
4. 255 So.2d 842 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1971).
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of the lease form in question. The activities engaged in prior
to the exploration date of the lease were deemed to constitute
"drilling operations." Although the cases cited by the court do
not all concern precisely the same wording, this decision is in
keeping with the tenor of the jurisprudence in this and other
jurisdictions. 7
Payment of Royalties
Alvord v. Sun Oil Co." is another in the mounting body of
jurisprudence concerning late commencement of royalty pay-
ments. The default clause of the lease in question required the
giving of notice by the lessor if operations were not being con-
ducted in compliance with the lease contract. No notice was
given under the clause. Relying on the prior decision of the
supreme court in Bouterie v. Kleinpeter,9 which construed an
almost identical clause, the court held that payment of royalty
did not qualify as "operations" and that the clause was therefore
inapplicable. There is no doubt in the writer's mind that both
the Bouterie and Alvord decisions are correct in the construction
of the default clauses in question. The matter reached the court
of appeal in Alvord by virtue of the fact that the lower court had
sustained defendant lessee's exception of prematurity on the
ground of failure to comply with the default clause. The impact
on that controversy was that the issue of whether a notice of
default was required must now be determined under the general
5. Hilliard v. Franzheim, 180 So.2d 746 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1965); Wehran
v. Hells, 152 So.2d 220 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1963); Crye v. Giles, 200 So. 155 (La.
App. 2d Cir. 1941).
6. Hiliard v. Franzhe m, 180 So.2d 746 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1965) involved
construction of an overriding royalty deed under the terms of which the
vendor agreed to "start a well" within ninety days. This case contains a
reasonably full summary of the Louisiana jurisprudence and the various
types of wording construed in different cases. In Wehran v. Helis, 152 So.2d
220, 223 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1963), the lease contained a definition of when
operations were deemed to be commenced. Operations were deemed to be
commenced "when the first material is placed on the ground." This was
interpreted as meaning material to be used in the drilling of the well, and
thus presence of a dredge preparing the drill site to receive the drilling
barge was held to be insufficient. Crye v. Giles, 200 So. 155 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1941), construed the phrase "operations for drilling." None of these phrases
is exactly the same as that construed in the decision under discussion, and
an argument could be made that each of them is distinguishable from the
lease provisions construed in the instant case.
7. See 3 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, OIL & GAS LAW § 618 (1971).
8. 251 So.2d 659 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1971).
9. 258 La. 605, 247 So.2d 548 (1971).
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law of default derived from provisions of the Civil Code and
jurisprudential extensions thereof. Ordinarily, failure to pay
royalty, construed as a form of rent, would, even in the absence
of a default clause, be a passive breach necessitating a putting
in default as a prerequisite to an action for cancellation.'0 How-
ever, under a body of jurisprudence stemming from Melancon
v. Texas Co.," if the failure to pay royalty is for an appreciable
length of time and without justification, what would otherwise
be a passive breach of the lease is transmuted into an active
breach and failure of the lessor to place the lessee in default will
not prevent his assertion of the right to a cancellation of the
lease. In view of the fact that the lessee had not commenced
payment of royalties for approximately one year after first pro-
duction, the lessor earned a significant victory by the holding
that the express default clause was inapplicable.
Working Interests Transactions
In Sklar Producing Co. v. Rushing,12 a concursus proceeding,
one of the claimants to a disputed sum representing the value of
production claimed to be due under an overriding royalty agree-
ment appears to have been the victim of an error in documenta-
tion. A letter agreement was negotiated under the terms of
which Dr. J. S. Rushing agreed to assign certain leases to Sklar.
It was agreed that Sklar would, within a specified time, move a
rig onto a location other than the leases in question and attempt
the recompletion of a gas well. It was further agreed that if
the well became productive, the assignments would be executed
and that Sklar would assign to Rushing an overriding royalty of
one thirty-second of seven-eighths of "all gas and accompanying
hydrocarbons that may be recovered" from the recompleted well.
The well in question was designated as a unit well for a unit
including the leases to be assigned under the agreement. How-
ever, as noted, the well was not located on the leases which were
the subject of the letter agreement.
The well was completed and there was a subsequent assign-
10. LA. Civ. CODn arts. 1931, 1933.
11. 230 La. 593, 89 So.2d 135 (1956). For an excellent treatment of the
development of this body of jurisprudence see Comment, 24 LA. L. Rsv. 618
(1964). For a brief review of the jurisprudence since the date of publication
of that comment, see Symposium, 31 LA. L. Rsv. 263, 271.
12. 262 So.2d 115 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1972).
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ment which purported to be in fulfillment of the terms of the
letter agreement. However, the assignment reserved an over-
riding royalty of one thirty-second of seven-eighths of "all gas
and/or condensate produced, saved and sold from the lands and
formations affected by the leases hereby assigned." Clearly, the
letter agreement contemplated an override measured by total
unit production. However, the documentation of the assignment
limited the override to production from the leases assigned.
Between the date of the letter agreement and the date of the
final assignment, Sklar had assigned to Moffatt another overrid-
ing royalty. Under the terms of that assignment Moffatt agreed
that his overriding royalty would bear "any and all overriding or
excess royalties to which the leases" were subject. In its final
posture, the contest was between the estate of Dr. Rushing on
the one hand and Moffatt and related holders of portions of the
interest acquired by him on the other. The Rushing estate
attempted to secure the admission of the letter agreement into
evidence and a construction of the assignment with the letter
agreement. This attempt was based on the fact that the assign-
ment expressly incorporated the unrecorded letter agreement by
reference. The Moffatt group, on the other hand, contended that
under the public records doctrine they were not bound by any
unrecorded letter agreement. Thus, as the override actually
reserved in the assignment to Sklar was limited to the "lands
and formations affected by the leases" assigned, the Moffatt group
contended that they were not burdened by the Rushing override
except to that extent. The court agreed with the Moffatt group.
This decision is a proper application of the public records
doctrine. Certainly those interested in the Rushing estate are
entitled to feel frustrated, if not outraged, under the circum-
stances. Had the contest been between Rushing and Sklar, the
original parties, the incorporation by reference would have been
effective and the assignment would have had to be construed in
the light of the letter agreement, and if deemed necessary,
reformed in accordance with it. However, it is clear that under
the public records doctrine in Louisiana, a third party cannot be
bound by the contents of such an unrecorded instrument.
Despite the correctness of the holding as to application of
the public records doctrine, the case is nevertheless puzzling.
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Sklar and Rushing agreed to the creation of an overriding roy-
alty measured by total unit production. Sklar then sold to Mof-
fatt an override, and under the terms of the agreement Moffatt
agreed to bear any other outstanding overrides. One wonders
whether, by an agreement with Moffatt, Sklar can push around
the burden of the Rushing override at will. If the intent of the
letter agreement between Sklar and Rushing was that Rushing
would have an override out of the leases assigned amounting to
one thirty-second of seven-eighths of total unit production, that
overriding royalty would seem to be a burden on the entirety of
the working interest of the assigned leases. Although Moffatt
could certainly agree to assume the burden of Rushing's overrid-
ing royalty interest, it seems questionable whether by contract-
ing with someone else Sklar can effectively limit Rushing's right
to secure his agreed share of production to the interest created
by him in favor of Moffatt. Thus, it seems to the writer that
although Moffatt definitely is not bound, Sklar might be con-
sidered as continuing to be bound to fulfill the terms of the
letter agreement as incorporated by reference in the assignment.
CORPORATIONS
Milton M. Harrison*
The Louisiana courts only infrequently have disregarded
corporateness, pierced the corporate veil, or treated the corpora-
tion as the alter ego of even a sole shareholder in order to assess
personal liability on the shareholder for corporate obligations.
In Pasternack v. Louisiana & Ariz. Lands, Inc.,1 however, the
court disregarded the corporateness. The corporation had as its
only asset certain immovable property. It was agreed by the
corporation, through its sole shareholder as president, that plain-
tiff would be paid a broker's commission of $25,000 if optionees
exercised their option to purchase the property belonging to the
corporation. In lieu of exercising its option, the optionees pur-
chased from the sole shareholder all shares in the corporation
and dissolved the corporation with the property distributed to
themselves. As part payment for the shares in the corporation
the former sole shareholder was given a mortgage on the prop-
erty, thus becoming a preferred creditor. The corporation after
*Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 254 So.2d 142 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1971).
